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Abstract
BACKGROUND
Demographic heterogeneity refers to the observation that – within the same population –
trajectories of survival and reproduction differ substantially between individuals. These
differences have been found in both natural and captive populations. Models in ecology
and evolution that incorporate demographic heterogeneity can improve both our under-
standing of the evolution of mortality curves and our population management abilities.
Current explanations of the origin of demographic heterogeneity mostly revolve around
interindividual differences that are either present at birth (fixed heterogeneity) or the re-
sult of stochasticity in life history realization (dynamic heterogeneity). Largely neglected
remains the possibility that a form of fixed heterogeneity may evolve from interactions
between behaviorally distinct individuals through their lifespan.
OBJECTIVE
We suggest one possible way in which heterogeneity in vital rates may evolve. Our
approach assumes game theoretic interactions in the population.
METHODS
We combine population matrix models and game theory. We study a stable coexistence
game between two types that are initially demographically homogeneous and analyze the
effect of mutations that influence the trajectories of survival and reproduction.
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RESULTS
The rise and fixation of mutations can make the population demographically heteroge-
neous, while the game can preserve the coexistence of different types in the population.
CONCLUSIONS
Frequency-dependent selection can help to explain the evolution of demographic hetero-
geneity.
CONTRIBUTION
Frequency-dependent selection can maintain already existing demographic heterogene-
ity in a population without overlapping generations. Here, we show that this form of
selection can also be involved in the origin of a form of fixed heterogeneity.
1. Introduction
Evolutionary game theory is an approach to modeling evolutionary change with a focus
on fitness as a function of both an individual’s traits and the traits of others in the popu-
lation (Maynard Smith 1982; Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998; Nowak 2006). Evolutionary
demographic theory is an approach to modeling evolutionary change with a focus on
fitness as the outcome of successive events of survival and reproduction along the lifes-
pan (Stearns 1992; Charlesworth 1994; Caswell 2001). So far, only a few attempts have
been made to combine these two approaches (Kokko 1997; Cressman 2003; Chambon-
Dubreuil et al. 2006). Yet, it seems instructive to study their interplay, as either approach
alone may neglect an important factor driving evolutionary change. Recently, a model
was proposed to integrate demography into a standard model of evolutionary game the-
ory (Li et al. 2015). Here, we integrate game theory into a standard model of evolutionary
demography. Our objective is to unveil the potential importance of evolutionary games
to considerations of life histories. In particular, we show how games may contribute to
explain a possible mechanism behind the evolution of a form of fixed heterogeneity in
vital rates. Natural populations are usually heterogeneous, i.e., they host a variety of
different types. Such variation is the fuel of evolution (Maynard Smith 1995, 1986; May-
nard Smith and Szathma´ry 1995; Lewontin 1970). Types that have certain traits (e.g.,
the ability to find food or run, associated with higher survival and reproductive abilities,
i.e., higher Darwinian fitness) tend to progressively increase their representation in the
population, eventually leading to the evolution of this in terms of a change in the types’
relative abundance (Maynard Smith 1995, 1986; Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry 1995;
Lewontin 1970). The process requires that evolutionarily successful traits are transmit-
ted (e.g., genetically) to descendants (Maynard Smith 1995, 1986; Maynard Smith and
Szathma´ry 1995; Lewontin 1970).
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A form of variation upon which selection may operate is demographic variation,
which refers to interindividual diversity in survival and reproductive performances along
the lifespan. Such demographic heterogeneity can be of two main kinds. The first kind is
fixed demographic heterogeneity, which refers to the presence of individuals within the
same population who are expected to follow different trajectories of survival and fertility
through their lives. This kind of heterogeneity is called ‘fixed’ because it derives from
individual differences that are present at birth, e.g., genetically coded and remaining un-
modified thereafter. Such differences arise as a result of different individual traits with an
effect on survival and/or reproduction and, therefore, selection can act upon such forms
of heterogeneity. However, while traits underlying interindividual diversity can, in princi-
ple, be measured, sometimes they may not be observed and need to be postulated (Vaupel,
Manton, and Stallard 1979). Fixed heterogeneity contrasts with dynamic heterogeneity
(Tuljapurkar, Steiner, and Orzack 2009). Individuals may transition through a number of
stages (reproductive level, spatial location) along their lifespan. Each stage can be as-
sociated with stage-specific fertility and survival levels. When the transitioning through
stages is governed by a stochastic process, each individual follows a random trajectory.
The probabilistic nature of such transitions generates dynamic demographic heterogene-
ity (Tuljapurkar, Steiner, and Orzack 2009), which need not be based on interindividual
intrinsic differences. Individuals with the same propensities to move from one stage to the
other may in fact spend different amounts of time in different stages because of random
factors. As a consequence, they will realize different survival and reproductive perfor-
mances. Importantly, dynamic heterogeneity gives rise to a form of variation that cannot
be acted upon by natural selection because it is not based on heritable differences (Steiner
and Tuljapurkar 2012).
Heterogeneity in vital rates is widespread in wild populations (Vaupel et al. 1998),
including humans (Yashin, Iachine, and Harris 1999). Yet it is unclear how much of
it is accounted for by either fixed heterogeneity or dynamic heterogeneity (Steiner and
Tuljapurkar 2012) and how exactly they can be separated when it comes to analyzing
data (Plard et al. 2012; Cam, Aubry, and Authier 2016). Also, more articulated kinds of
heterogeneity can be distinguished. For example, genetically identical individuals may
sense differently a changing environment and have a different phenotypic response or
they may stochastically switch to different phenotypes, some of which may be the best
response to the current environment (Kussel and Leibler 2005). For a recent review of
the different concepts and models of heterogeneity in demographic rates, see Wilson and
Nussey (2010). A better understanding of demographic heterogeneity, however, may be
instructive for population management. The growth rate and extinction risk of a popula-
tion are influenced by the population’s level of demographic heterogeneity in a way that
homogeneous population models cannot account for (Kendall et al. 2011). Demographic
heterogeneity may also help to explain some evolutionarily puzzling observations; for
example, results from cohort studies on controlled, captive populations show decelera-
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tion of mortality at very late ages (Carey et al. 1992; Curtsinger et al. 1992). This is at
odds with the prediction from classical evolutionary theory of senescence, which predicts
increasing mortality with age (Hamilton 1966; Charlesworth and Partridge 1997). How-
ever, the presence of subcohorts all experiencing a steady increase in mortality with age
but at different rates can explain this effect (Curtsinger et al. 1992; Vaupel and Carey
1993; Chen, Zajitschek, and Maklakov 2013), as the aggregate cohort may not display a
monotonically increasing mortality with age in that case (Vaupel and Yashin 1985). A
similar explanation can be provided based on dynamic heterogeneity (Horvitz and Tul-
japurkar 2008), as well as based on some form of heterogeneity that is present at birth yet
still potentially modifiable thereafter (Le Bras 1976; Yashin, Vaupel, and Iachine 1994).
A question that has not received much attention is how fixed demographic hetero-
geneity can evolve, in the first place, and then persist. Certainly, mutation can always
inject new variants into the population. The large majority of such mutations are detri-
mental and are purged by selection, eventually leading to a mutation-selection balance,
which leaves room for variation. (For a general model for the equilibrium between mu-
tation and selection in age-structured populations, see Steinsaltz, Evans, and Wachter
2005.) However, the amount of this variation should depend on the mutation rate and
the force of selection. When the former is low and the latter strong, persistent varia-
tion may be limited. In general, substantial fixed heterogeneity is not trivial to explain
because it requires mechanisms that can generate it, while at the same time keeping fit-
ness equal between demographically different types. In the present work, we suggest
one possible answer to this question using evolutionary game theory, an approach that
lends itself to understanding how natural selection may maintain diversity in a population
(Maynard Smith 1982; Nowak 2006; Huang et al. 2012). We propose a model of an age-
structured population with two types of individuals involved in a coexistence game. This
game allows either subpopulation type to incorporate independent genetic variation that
makes the population demographically heterogeneous, while the types maintain equal
relative fitness. We start by describing the basic principle behind our model in a model
without age structure.
2. A population without age structure
We assume a population of two types of individuals, A and B, which is large enough
to be considered infinite for our purposes. It is not subject to density dependence, and
its dynamics depend on relative frequencies of types; i.e., the relative abundances of
types and not the total absolute population abundance has an effect on individual fitness.
Generations are nonoverlapping. Individuals are involved in two-player games with the
following payoff matrix:
200 http://www.demographic-research.org
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M =
( A B
A pAA pAB
B pBA pBB
)
, (1)
where pAA is the payoff to an individual of type A playing against another A; pAB is
the payoff to an individual of type A playing against a B individual; pBA is the payoff
to an individual of type B playing against an A individual; pBB is the payoff to an
individual of type B playing against another B. We assume that individuals are paired
at random to interact in the game. Let NA and NB be the number of A and the number
of B individuals, respectively, in the population and N the total population size. With a
fraction x = NAN of individuals of type A, the expected payoffs of an A individual and a
B individual are
piA(x) = xpAA + (1− x)pAB , (2a)
piB(x) = xpBA + (1− x)pBB . (2b)
The expected fitness of an individual is the sum of a baseline fitnessw0 and expected
payoff pi (Nowak et al. 2004). The expected fitness values of A and B are then
w¯A(x) = w
0
A + piA(x), (3a)
w¯B(x) = w
0
B + piB(x). (3b)
As we focus on the interplay between these two fitness terms, there is no need to
introduce an intensity of selection that would control the relative contribution of the ex-
pected payoff to fitness (Nowak et al. 2004).
Evolutionary dynamics is modeled according to the replicator dynamics in discrete
time (Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998), which implies that x in generation t+ 1 is given by
x(t+ 1) = x(t)
w¯A(x(t))
xw¯A(x(t)) + (1− x(t))w¯B(x(t)) . (4)
We assume that baseline fitness is initially equal between types, w0A = w
0
B , and that
A and B play a stable coexistence game, such that each type can invade a homogenous
population of the other type. In particular, we assume that payoff values satisfy
0 < pAA < pBA < pBB < pAB , (5)
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which implies that a homogeneous population of A is less fit than a homogeneous popu-
lation of B, but both can be invaded by mutants of the other type. The game has a unique
interior equilibrium at
x* =
pBB − pAB
pAA − pAB − pBA + pBB , (6)
which is a stable fixed point of the replicator dynamics.
At the fixed point, the population grows exponentially. Suppose that then, in one
type, a mutation arises that leads to a perturbation of the baseline fitness of a small addi-
tive amount. The mutation can go to fixation in the subpopulation of that type by either
selection or by drift. Typically, selection accounts for cases in which the mutation in-
creases the baseline fitness of the subpopulation, while drift accounts for cases in which
the mutation decreases fitness. Is coexistence then still possible? Without the game, pay-
offs are zero, and there is consequently a fitness difference between the two types. The
type with the higher fitness should take over the entire population. With the game, there
is the possibility that lower baseline fitness is compensated for by higher payoff in the
coexistence game due to frequency-dependent selection.
202 http://www.demographic-research.org
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Figure 1: Change in the stable fixed point with change in baseline fitness
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Note: Initially, w0A = w
0
B = 1. Then perturbations to the baseline fitness of A, i.e., ∆w 6= 0, lead to a change in
the equilibrium level xˆ, i.e., intersection, at which stable coexistence is attained. Payoffs are pAA = 0.1, pAB = 0.4,
pBA = 0.2 and pBB = 0.3.
Figure 1 shows that the coexistence game is qualitatively robust against such per-
turbations of the background fitness. For sufficiently small ∆w = w0B − w0A, there is a
different stable fixed point that still maintains the coexistence between the two subpopu-
lations. Setting w¯A = w¯B and solving for x, the stable fixed point is
xˆ =
∆w + pBB − pAB
pAA − pAB − pBA + pBB . (7)
At this new equilibrium, a difference in expected payoffs between types compen-
sates for ∆w 6= 0. Intuitively, the difference in background fitness appears only in the
numerator, as it cancels in the denominator where only the fitness differences of a type
appear. In the following, we use xˆ to indicate the fixed point when the baseline fitness of
the types may be different.
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3. A population with age structure
We now consider the age-structured model in which both the relative abundance of types
and individual age can affect the dynamics. As before, the population is very large, is not
subject to density dependence, and its dynamics depend on relative frequencies of types.
Individuals can survive from one step in time to the next, and, therefore, generations
overlap. We take A as the focal type to describe the dynamics. After the game, an A
individual of age j produces a number
F¯j,A = Fj,A + piA(x) (8)
of offspring. Fertility is the sum of an age- and type-dependent component Fj,A > 0 and
the expected payoff piA(x), which changes with the relative abundance x ofA. As payoffs
are strictly positive, we have F¯j,A > 0. Let nj,A(t) be the number ofA individuals in age
class j at t and nj,B(t) be the number of B individuals in age class j at t, with the total
subpopulations having size NA =
∑
j nj,A and NB =
∑
j nj,B , and the total population
being N = NA +NB . Then, the A fraction of the population is
x(t) =
∑
j nj,A(t)∑
j nj,A(t) +
∑
j nj,B(t)
=
NA(t)
NA(t) +NB(t)
=
NA(t)
N(t)
. (9)
Offspring enter the population in the next time step, to which the parent can survive
with a survival probability Sj,A, which again depends on age and type (but not on the
payoff). The dynamics of the A subpopulation is then determined by

n1,A(t+ 1)
n2,A(t+ 1)
...
...
nω,A(t+ 1)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
nA(t+1)
=

F¯1,A(x) F¯2,A(x) . . . F¯ω−1,A(x) F¯ω,A(x)
S1,A
S2,A
. . .
Sω−1,A

︸ ︷︷ ︸
L¯A(x)

n1,A(t)
n2,A(t)
...
...
nω,A(t)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
nA(t)
(10)
Here, ω is the maximum age class that A individuals can reach. The vector nA(t)
represents the subpopulation state at t. The matrix L¯A(t) is a population projection matrix
(PPM) that includes the subpopulation vital rates (i.e., a collective name for age-specific
survival and fertilities). It depends directly, via the fertilities, on x and via this also on
time t. The PPM and dynamics of B are similarly described.
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For technical purposes, we define the matrix
KA =

1 1 . . . 1 1
0 0 . . . 0 0
0 0 . . . 0 0
...
...
. . . 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
 (11)
which has the same dimensions as LA. A similar matrix is formed for B. We can then
write the dynamics of the abundances of the two subpopulations as
nA(t+ 1) = L¯A(x)nA(t) = (LA + piA(x)KA)nA(t) (12a)
nB(t+ 1) = L¯B(x)nB(t) = (LB + piB(x)KB)nB(t), (12b)
in which the matrices L¯A and L¯B are split up into a frequency-independent part, LA and
LB , and a frequency-dependent part, piA(x)KA and piB(x)KB . The matrices LA and
LB are non-negative, as their entries are equal to or greater than zero, and can be shown
irreducible (Caswell 2001). Therefore, the Perron-Froebenius theorem applies and we
can let λA be the Perron root of LA and λB be the Perron root of LB . As the effect of
expected payoffs is just to increase the value of some entries of these matrices, L¯A(x)
and L¯B(x) are also nonnegative and irreducible and have Perron roots λ¯A(x) and λ¯B(x),
respectively.
Without the game, the population dynamics are simply
nA(t+ 1) = LAnA(t) (13a)
nB(t+ 1) = LBnB(t). (13b)
This linear case is within the scope of the ergodic theorem in demography (Cohen
1979). When a nonzero population state vector is repeatedly multiplied by a constant,
non-negative and irreducible PPM, as in our case, the population state vector asymptot-
ically becomes proportional to the leading right eigenvector of that PPM, and the pop-
ulation grows at a rate equal to the Perron root of the PPM. Thus, asymptotically, the
population sizes in the system in Equation (13) change as
NA(t+ 1) = λANA(t) (14a)
NB(t+ 1) = λBNB(t), (14b)
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assuming that the two population state vectors are proportional to the right leading eigen-
vectors of the matrices L.
We assume that, initially, A and B have the same baseline vital rates, i.e., LA =
LB , and that the population is initiated at x = x*. With equal expected payoffs, we
obtain L¯A(x∗) = L¯B(x∗) with corresponding Perron roots at equilibrium λ¯A(x∗) =
λ¯B(x
∗). Provided the two population state vectors are proportional to the right leading
eigenvectors of the respective matrices evaluated at x = x∗, the subpopulations of A and
B stably grow over time at the same rate. Thus, at the fixed point, we recover linear
population dynamics
NA(t+ 1) = λ¯A(x
∗)NA(t) (15a)
NB(t+ 1) = λ¯B(x
∗)NB(t). (15b)
We now introduce a small perturbation to A. In the presence of age structure, mu-
tations can perturb one or more baseline vital rates of this type, but they do not change
the number of age classes. As in the demographically unstructured model, we assume
that mutations arise and go to fixation in the relevant subpopulation. We do not model
the transient phase of population dynamics that starts when the mutation frequency be-
comes non-negligible and, therefore, leads to a deviation from the game equilibrium and
the demographic equilibrium, up to when the mutation becomes fixed, which requires the
establishment of new game and demographic equilibria. Such modeling would involve
the use of tools for the analysis of the transients in matrix population models (see, e.g.,
Fox and Gurevitch 2000; Yearsley 2004; Caswell 2007; Stott, Townley, and Hodgson
2011), which would make our model exceedingly complex. Instead we rely on mutant
deviations that are sufficiently small so that a smooth passage from one equilibrium to
another is guaranteed by stability of coexistence (see below and Appendix). We write
A′ to indicate that the type has mutated and LA′ to refer to the mutated baseline PPM.
The mutation is not neutral, λB − λA′ 6= 0. In the absence of the game, the type whose
baseline projection matrix has the highest leading eigenvalue takes over. To understand
whether the game can preserve coexistence we study the new system
nA′(t+ 1) = L¯A′(x)nA′(t) = (LA′ + piA′(x)KA′)nA′(t) (16a)
nB(t+ 1) = L¯B(x)nB(t) = (LB + piB(x)KB)nB(t). (16b)
Note, however, that piA′(x) = piA(x), as mutations affect only baseline vital rates.
We look for values xˆ of x in (0, 1) such that the matrices L¯A′(xˆ) and L¯B(xˆ) have Perron
roots λ¯A′(xˆ) = λ¯B(xˆ) = λ¯(xˆ). In that case, A′ and B can coexist at xˆ by having equal
population growth. This requires demographic stability, i.e., nA′ and nB are proportional
to the leading right eigenvectors of the relevant matrices.
206 http://www.demographic-research.org
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Finding whether such fixed points exist and are stable is of relevance for the evo-
lution of demographic heterogeneity. Suppose that at the fixed point of the coexistence
game a mutant appears in one subpopulation and the mutation reaches fixation within
this subpopulation. Assume that a nearby alternative interior fixed point exists and is
stable. Then this fixed point is reached. At this new fixed point, the population is demo-
graphically heterogeneous. The two subpopulations have the same growth rate, yet their
equilibrium PPMs differ for two reasons. First, the mutation has made some baseline
vital rates different between types. Second, the expected payoffs between A′ and B must
be different in order to counteract the nonzero difference between λA′ and λB .
4. Analysis
4.1 Interior fixed points
The interior fixed points of the dynamics in Equations (16) correspond to coexistences
betweenA′ andB. We assume such points are isolated. To retrieve them, we borrow from
robust control theory applied to PPMs (Hodgson and Townley 2004; Hodgson, Townley,
and McCarthy 2006). In this approach, one considers a PPM (say, Y) that is assumed
non-negative and irreducible and, therefore, has a Perron root. A scalar amount δ > 0 is
added to some entries of Y. A new matrix is obtained that can be represented as
Y˜ = Y + δpqT , (17)
where p is a column vector and qT (here T indicates vector transposition) is a row vector
such that the product pqT is a sparse matrix of 0s and 1s of the same dimensions as Y,
where nonzero entries of pqT correspond to entries of Y to which δ is added. As Y˜ is also
non-negative and irreducible, let z be its Perron root. Following Hodgson and Townley
(2004), we write the usual eigenvector problem for this matrix as
Y˜c = (Y + δpqT )c = zc (18)
for some nonzero eigenvector c, which is guaranteed positive by the Perron-Froebenius
theorem. Subtracting Yc on both sides, this equation becomes δpqT c = (zI − Y)c.
If z is not an eigenvalue of Y, the inverse of (zI − Y) exists. Multiplying on the left,
first, by (zI − Y)−1 and, then, by qT both sides of the equation, we obtain δqT (zI −
Y)−1pqT c = qT c. Note that qT c is a nonzero scalar. Dividing the equation by qT c, we
get δqT (zI− Y)−1p = 1. Let G(z) = qT (zI− Y)−1p, then we obtain the relationship
δqT (zI− Y)−1p = δG(z) = 1. (19)
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The function G(z) is called the transfer function and is a rational function in z im-
plicitly relating δ with z (Hodgson and Townley 2004; Hodgson, Townley, and McCarthy
2006).
We can adopt this approach to capture exactly the effect of expected payoffs on
the Perron roots of LA′ and LB . The structure of the change induced by expected pay-
offs for A′ is represented by KA′ , which we can express by setting KA′ = pA′qTA′ =
[1, 0, 0, .., 0]T [1, 1, 1, .., 1]. The magnitude of the change is represented by the expected
payoffs so that δ = piA′ . We adopt the same procedure for B. We then write the trans-
fer functions for A′ as piA′qTA′(zIA′ − LA′)−1pA′ = piA′GA′(z) = 1 and for B as
piBqTB(zIB − LB)−1pB = piBGB(z) = 1. Using the definition of expected payoffs in
Equations (2) and solving for x, we can write for the two types
x =
(GA′(z))
−1 − pAB
pAA − pAB (20a)
x =
(GB(z))
−1 − pBB
pBA − pBB . (20b)
Equating these two expressions, we obtain
(pBA − pBB)[(GA′(z))−1 − pAB ] = (pAA − pAB)[(GB(z))−1 − pBB ]. (21)
This can be written as
pAApBB − pABpBA = pAA − pAB
GB(z)
− pBA − pBB
GA′(z)
. (22)
The left side of this expression is the determinant of the payoff matrix det(M). Dividing
through Equation (22) by this determinant, we get
1 =
1
det(M)
(
pAA − pAB
GB(z)
− pBA − pBB
GA′(z)
)
. (23)
The right side of this expression is a rational function in z. Any real root zˆ of
Equation (23) corresponds to the stable growth rate shared by A′ and B at fixed points
xˆ of the dynamics in Equation (16). Relevant roots zˆ must be strictly within λ¯B(0)
and λ¯B(1) so that xˆ is constrained to the (0, 1) interval. The corresponding value of
xˆ for some root zˆ can be retrieved from either expression in Equation (20) by setting
z = zˆ. Properties of such fixed points (e.g., linear stability, existence, and uniqueness)
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are derived in the Appendix. These properties guarantee that when the system is at an
initial stable fixed point and A mutates to A′, then a new nearby interior fixed point (if it
exists) should be reached. A numerical example is given in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Dynamics of the frequency of A and the stable fixed point under a
perturbation
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Note: A population in which A and B have equal vital rates (see inset PPM) is initiated and the dynamics of x are
followed for 1,000 time steps. Initial state vectors are [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1]T for A and 9946 [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1]
T for B. Initial
total population size is 1, 000 and x(0) = 61000 . Neither subpopulation is at the stable age distribution implied
by the common PPM. At t = 500, A is mutated to A′ (see inset PPM). Payoffs are pAA = 0.1, pAB = 0.4,
pBA = 0.2 and pBB = 0.3.
4.2 Fixed-point sensitivity
The model in Equation (23) is challenging to analyze with respect to a specific perturba-
tion that changes LA into LA′ . However, it is possible to formulate a simpler, approxi-
mate model similar to Equation (7), provided successive mutations that lead fromA toA′
affect only a single vital rate and are of small effect, and expected payoffs are also small.
Consider the initial scenario in which A and B have identical vital rates. Define the
matrix L with nonzero entries Sj = Sj,A = Sj,B and Fj = Fj,A = Fj,B and Perron
root λ = λA = λB with corresponding right (column) u and left (row) vT eigenvectors
normalized so that
∑
j uj = 1 and v
Tu = 1. The vector u is proportional to the stable age
distribution for the matrix population model L, while v is usually called the reproductive
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value vector, as its j component is proportional to the relative contribution made to the
future population by individuals of age j (Caswell 2001). Define the matrix K = KA =
KB . Suppose that some entries of L depend on a parameter θ so that we can write L(θ).
Differentiating the eigenvector equation λ = vTL(θ)u with respect to θ and evaluating at
θ = 0 while eigenvectors are assumed constant leads to
∂λ
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
= vT
∂L
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
u, (24)
which corresponds to a classic result (Caswell 2001). We can use Equation (24) for two
purposes. First, we can capture the linear change in λ due to expected payoffs by setting
θ = pi. Then,
L(pi) =

F1 + pi F2 + pi . . . Fω + pi
S1
. . .
Sω−1
 (25)
and the sensitivity of λ to expected payoffs is
∂λ
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
pi=0
= vT
∂L
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
pi=0
u = vTKu = v1. (26)
Second, we can use Equations (24) and (26) to get an expression for the sensitivity
of the initial fixed point to mutations in one type. Using Equation (26), we have that, to
a linear approximation, the Perron root of L¯A(x) = LA + piA(x)K is λ¯A(x) ≈ λA +
v1piA(x) and the Perron root of L¯B(x) = LB + piB(x)K is λ¯B(x) ≈ λB + v1piB(x).
Therefore, at a fixed point of the dynamics in Equation (15), we have
λA + v1piA(xˆ) ≈ λB + v1piB(xˆ) (27)
solving this for xˆ by using Equation (2),
xˆ ≈ λB − λA + v1(pBB − pAB)
v1(pAA − pAB − pBA + pBB) . (28)
At the initial fixed point (i.e., prior to perturbations on either type), λB−λA = 0 and
Equation (28) is exact, as it gives the fixed point xˆ = x∗. To understand the effect that a
perturbation θ on some nonzero entry of LA has on the initial fixed point, we differentiate
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Equation (28) with respect to θ. We do so by treating v1 as constant. We also keep in
mind that the perturbation involves only A and, therefore, λB is not a function of θ. We
then obtain an expression for the fixed-point sensitivity to the perturbation
∂x
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
≈ − 1
v1(pAA − pAB − pBA + pBB)
∂λ
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
. (29)
Note that the denominator in this expression is negative and, therefore,
∂x
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
∝ ∂λ
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
. (30)
We can thus linearly approximate the new fixed point that pertains to the dynamics
in Equation (16) after the perturbation from the initial equilibrium x∗ where A and B
have identical vital rates as
xˆ ≈ x∗ − θ
v1(pAA − pAB − pBA + pBB)
∂λ
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
. (31)
We further assume that the mutation perturbs fertilities in an additive fashion, while
it perturbs survival in a multiplicative fashion, as usual in population genetic models with
age structure (Charlesworth 1994), and that the perturbation is limited to a single vital
rate. Then, using Equation (24),
∂λ
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
=
{
v1uj , if perturbation is on Fj
vj+1ujSj , if perturbation is on Sj ,
(32)
as shown in (Caswell 1978). A classical result in evolutionary demography about the
relative magnitudes of these derivatives in populations that are not decreasing in size is
v1uj ≥ v1uj+1 (33)
vj+1ujSj ≥ vj+2uj+1Sj+1 (34)
(Hamilton 1966; Charlesworth 1994; Caswell 2001).
Intuitively, this means that perturbations at older ages affect the population dynamics
less. Population growth is more sensitive to an additive change in fertility, or a multiplica-
tive change in survival, at an earlier age rather than at later ages. In our case, this means
that coexistence is more likely to be preserved when a late life vital rate is perturbed com-
pared to when the perturbation hits an early life vital rate. In Figure 3, we apply Equation
http://www.demographic-research.org 211
Giaimo et al.: Evolution of fixed demographic heterogeneity from a game of stable coexistence
(31) to each nonzero entry of a projection matrix LA while keeping the initially identical
matrix LB constant. Figure 3 shows that the fixed point is less sensitive to late life, as
opposed to early life perturbations in vital rates.
Figure 3: Fixed-point sensitivity analysis
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5. Numerical exploration
5.1 Pleiotropy
Mutations can perturb more than one vital rate, at more than one age and in different
directions (e.g., increasing one vital rate while decreasing another). We refer to this as
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pleiotropy. In addition, mutations can hit either type A or B, and the magnitude may
not always be small, as it is required to be by the model in Equation (31). Vital rate
perturbations of this kind appear to be of particular interest for the study of demographic
heterogeneity, as they should lead to a higher demographic diversity between the two
types compared to perturbations limited to a single vital rate. Instead of using the ap-
proximate model of the previous section, here we numerically explore the exact model
in Equation (23) to understand more precisely how much demographic heterogeneity the
stable coexistence game can tolerate without one type dominating the other when both
subpopulations separately incorporate pleiotropic mutations.
To this aim, we parametrize the set of baseline vital rates that are initially shared
between A and B. Survival follows a Gompertz mortality function, which is commonly
used to model mammalian mortality (Gage 1998, 2001). In continuous time, Gompertz
mortality at age t is µ(t) = aebt where a > 0 gives baseline mortality and b is the rate of
aging. In discrete time, this translates to
Sj = exp
(
−
∫ j+1
j
µ(y)dy
)
= exp
(
−
∫ j+1
j
aebydy
)
= exp
[
−a
b
(
eb(j+1) − ebj
)]
.
(35)
Survival can either decline (b > 0), improve (b < 0), or stay constant (b = 0) with
age. As for fertility, we set
Fj = cj(ω + 1− j)2, (36)
where ω is the last age class. Thus, fertility is a third-degree polynomial in j, similar
to that commonly used to model primate fertility (Gage 1998). With fixed c > 0, Fj is
positive at all ages, increases from age 1 to a peak at some intermediate age, and then
declines to the last age class.
We can now perturb a, b, and c as a proxy to the effect of the fixation of pleiotropic
mutations.
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Figure 4: Regions of stable coexistence between two types under pleiotropic
mutations
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We look at whether stable coexistence is possible when each type is perturbed for
only one of the three above parameters. Figure 4 explores all possible pairwise combina-
tions of pleiotropic perturbations and reports for each pair of perturbation values whether
there is an equilibrium frequency xˆ at which the two types have equal fitness. Figure 4
shows that stable coexistence is preserved for quite ample regions of the parameter space
when perturbations involve survival parameters. This supports the robustness of the coex-
istence game against small, nonneutral pleiotropic mutations that arise and fixate within
each subpopulation. However, we also see that the amount by which fertility can be per-
turbed while keeping coexistence is much narrower. This is explained by the fact that, in
our model, a change in fertility has a very strong effect on fitness.
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5.2 Cohort mortality
The average mortality in a cohort of same-age individuals from a demographically het-
erogeneous population differs from the mortalities observed in cohorts from composing
subpopulations (Curtsinger et al. 1992; Vaupel and Carey 1993; Chen, Zajitschek, and
Maklakov 2013; Vaupel and Yashin 1985). Here we show that interesting patterns of av-
erage cohort mortality can be retrieved from points inside coexistence regions like those
explored in the previous section. Each point in this region represents a population that
is characterized by a certain equilibrium frequency xˆ of A individuals and by the two
projection matrices of A and B evaluated at equilibrium. In both subpopulations, age-
specific mortality follows a Gompertz function (defined above), possibly with different
values for the parameters a and b between the two subpopulations. To observe the average
mortality in a cohort of age 1 individuals that are sampled from this population, we adapt
the methods of Vaupel and Yashin (1985). From the equilibrium projection matrices of
A and B, we compute the respective equilibrium birth rates mA and mB . Here, m is
defined as the stable fraction of individuals that, at each time step, enter the first age class
at demographic stability. Thus, if at demographic stability uj is the stable fraction of
individuals in age class j and Fj is the number of individuals in age class 1 at t + 1 per
individual in age class j at t,
m =
∑
j
ujFj . (37)
The initial fraction of age 1 individuals of type A at demographic stability is
ϑ1 =
xˆmA
xˆmA + (1− xˆ)mB , (38)
the remaining fraction 1− ϑ1 being of type B. We then look at mortality in the cohort of
individuals of age 1 composed of a fraction ϑ1 of A and a fraction (1 − ϑ1) of B. The
proportion pA(y) of theA subcohort that survives at least to age y is exp
(− ∫ y
1
µA(t)dt
)
.
The corresponding parameter for B, pB(y), is found analogously. When our cohort is of
age y, the fraction of A individuals is
ϑy =
ϑ1pA(y)
ϑ1pA(y) + (1− ϑ1)pB(y) , (39)
and average mortality at y in the cohort is
µ¯(y) = ϑyµA(y) + (1− ϑy)µB(y). (40)
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Figure 5: Average cohort mortality at coexistence
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Figure 5 shows the average cohort mortality for three different cases of coexistence
along with the underlying mortality in the component subcohorts. Panel a) shows simple
exponentially increasing average cohort mortality with age. Approximately this form of
mortality characterizes adult life in many mammal species (Promislow 1991). Panel b)
displays increasing average cohort mortality with age with a slight ‘bump’ in mortality
at young adult ages. This is a pattern that is typical of human male demography (Carey
and Judge 2000), where the passage to adulthood is marked by slightly increased risk of
death. Panel c) shows average cohort mortality that levels off at late ages. This form of
mortality is documented in flies, nematodes, and humans (Vaupel et al. 1998).
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6. Conclusions
The emergence and maintenance of demographic heterogeneity in a population can be
explained by some form of frequency-dependent selection (Le Cunff, Baudisch, and Pak-
daman 2013). Le Cunff, Baudisch, and Pakdaman (2013) used stochastic agent-based
simulations to show that types with discrete generations that differently allocate resources
between survival and reproduction along their life may have equal fitness. For example,
in their model, individuals that invest in early reproduction have a selective advantage
in the first part of life over individuals that invest in early survival; in late life, the situ-
ation is reversed. An important numerical result of Le Cunff, Baudisch, and Pakdaman
(2013) is that, in a population with an initially random distribution of allocation strate-
gies, frequency-dependent selection eventually produces a quasi-stationary distribution
of types. The average mortality in a cohort of individuals from the quasi-stable popula-
tion qualitatively resembles that observed in cohorts of captive organisms and in humans
(Le Cunff, Baudisch, and Pakdaman 2013).
In Le Cunff, Baudisch, and Pakdaman (2013), however, the initial population is as-
sumed heterogeneous, and generations are not overlapping. Some questions are then left
unanswered: How can a population become heterogeneous in the first place? Can types
with different survival and reproductive strategies also stably coexist when generations
overlap? When generations overlap, does the age distribution of the population play a
role in the dynamics of demographic heterogeneity? In the present study, we addressed
the first two open questions. As for the third, we simply note here that there may be non-
intuitive consequences of selection on different fitness components in finite populations,
depending on the initial stable age distribution (Li et al. 2016).
As for the first question, we showed that demographic heterogeneity may evolve
from populations that initially are homogeneous from a demographic point of view, but
that contain two behavioral types. On the background of a stable coexistence game be-
tween these two behaviorally distinct types, mutations can perturb vital rates of either
type generating heterogeneity, yet coexistence is preserved. Provided that game payoffs
are important in determining fitness, the game is qualitatively robust against perturba-
tions, and frequency-dependent selection is key in maintaining diversity. Therefore, a
form of fixed demographic heterogeneity may emerge from mutations in homogeneous
populations. It should be kept in mind that our fundamental assumption is that the ini-
tial population is composed of two behaviorally different types, and such difference has
a genetic basis, e.g., overdominance (Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998; Traulsen and Reed
2012). This may not always be a precondition for demographic heterogeneity, however.
The presence of heterogeneous vital rates in a population is a prominent explanation of
late-life deceleration of mortality observed in some species. Studies observed such de-
celeration both in cohorts of genetically heterogeneous medflies (Carey et al. 1992) and
in highly inbred strains of flies (Curtsinger et al. 1992). This observation shows that
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demographic heterogeneity is not necessarily connected with fixed heterogeneity, as we
assume, and other forms of heterogeneity may play a role, as reviewed in the introduction
section.
With regard to the second question, we showed that with overlapping generations
also, frequency-dependent selection can maintain demographic heterogeneity. Differently
from Le Cunff, Baudisch, and Pakdaman (2013), in our framework we opted for a deter-
ministic model in which fitness is identified with the population growth rate. As a draw-
back, the presence of overlapping generations has complicated the analysis of our model.
Therefore, we used numerical methods to find regions of coexistence under pleiotropic
mutations. Using perturbation theory, we performed fixed-point sensitivity analysis to
study how infinitesimal perturbations on single vital rates impact on the stable equilib-
rium between types. Our analysis predicted a higher level of heterogeneity in late life.
This may be somehow expected in the light of the classic result, indicating that selective
dynamics in age-structured populations in a constant environment show diminished sen-
sitivity to changes in late-life fitness components (Hamilton 1966; Charlesworth 1994;
Caswell 2001). Yet it is relevant to see how a similar result can be derived from a game
theoretical setting that represents a different context from the constant fitness scenario
assumed in the derivation of this classic result. We have not considered the scenario in
which the environment stochastically changes with time so that vital rates fluctuate in
response to it. The population then has a stochastic growth rate (Tuljapurkar 1990). The
analysis of this scenario is much more complicated, as it requires the sensitivities of the
stochastic growth rate, which involve the second derivatives of the leading eigenvalue of
the average projection matrix (Caswell 2001). As a consequence, the relationship be-
tween fitness in early life and fitness in late life may also be less transparent than in the
case of a constant environment (e.g., Orzack and Tuljapurkar 1989).
Interestingly, results based on pleiotropic mutations in our model can qualitatively
mimic some mortality patterns that have been observed in natural and captive cohorts.
This encourages us to further explore the potential of crossing demographic thinking
with game theoretic approaches to explain patterns of mortality, and fertility, observed in
nature.
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Appendix
Linear stability
Here we establish the linear stability of interior fixed points of the dynamics in Equation
(16). Along with the set of inequalities in (5), we also assume
pAA < pBA < pBB < pAB < 1, (41)
so that payoffs make a limited contribution to fitness. First of all, uj,A′(t) =
nj,A′
NA′
(t) and
uj,B(t) =
nj,B
NB
(t), i.e., the current fractions of the A and B subpopulations in age class
j. Then, using Equation (10), we write a dynamic equation for x, which is now the A′
fraction of the population, and we implicitly define a function f(x(t)),
x(t+ 1) =
NA′ (t+ 1)
NA′ (t+ 1) +NB(t+ 1)
=
∑
j nj,A′ (t)(F¯j,A′ (t) + Sj,A′ )∑
j nj,A′ (t)(F¯j,A′ (t) + Sj,A′ ) +
∑
j nj,B(t)(F¯j,B(t) + Sj,B)
=
x(t)N(t)
∑
j uj,A′ (t)(F¯j,A′ (t) + Sj,A′ )
x(t)N(t)
∑
j uj,A′ (t)(F¯j,A′ (t) + Sj,A′ ) + (1− x(t))N(t)
∑
j uj,B(t)(F¯j,B(t) + Sj,B)
=
x(t)WA′ (t)
x(t)WA′ (t) + (1− x(t))WB(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
f(x(t))
,
(42)
where it is assumed that Sω,A = Sω,B = 0 and where WA′(t) =
∑
j uj,A′(t)(F¯j,A′(t) +
Sj,A′) and WB(t) =
∑
j uj,B(t)(F¯j,B(t) + Sj,B). To simplify notation, we set
M(t) = x(t)WA′(t) + (1− x(t))WB(t). (43)
We differentiate W using Equations (2) and (8),
∂WA′
∂x
=
∑
j
uj,A′(pAA − pAB) = (pAA − pAB)
∑
j
uj,A′ = pAA − pAB , (44)
and, similarly,
∂WB
∂x
=
∑
j
uj,B(pBA − pBB) = (pBA − pBB)
∑
j
uj,B = pBA − pBB . (45)
Thus,
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∂M
∂x
= WA′ + x(pAA − pAB) + pBA − pBB −WB − x(pBA − pBB), (46)
and, finally,
∂f
∂x
=
1
M2
[
M (WA′ + xpAA − xpAB)− xWA′ ∂M
∂x
]
. (47)
We evaluate this expression at some interior equilibrium x(t) = xˆ recalling that,
at this equilibrium, we also have demographic stability and, therefore, NA(t + 1) =
λ¯(xˆ)NA(t) and NB(t + 1) = λ¯(xˆ)NB(t) where λ¯(xˆ) = λ¯A(xˆ) = λ¯B(xˆ) is the leading
eigenvalue shared by L¯A′(xˆ) and L¯B(xˆ). Hence, as WA′(xˆ) = WB(xˆ) = λ¯(xˆ),
∂f
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=xˆ
= 1 +
xˆ(1− xˆ)(pAA − pAB − pBA + pBB)
λ¯(xˆ)
. (48)
Because of the inequalities in (5) and (41),
− 1 < pAA − pAB − pBA + pBB < 0. (49)
Note also that in Equation (48) we should have λ¯ ≥ 1(xˆ), as it makes sense to focus
only on populations that are not going extinct, i.e., geometric growth per time unit should
not be smaller than unity. Thus,
0 <
xˆ(1− xˆ)
λ¯(xˆ)
<
1
4
, (50)
and
1− 1
4
<
∂f
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=xˆ
< 1. (51)
We then conclude that the interior fixed point x = xˆ is linearly stable. We have
assumed that A′ and B may have different vital rates. However, the same result holds for
A and B when the two types share the same vital rates. This means that when the system
is at an initial stable fixed point and A mutates to A′, a new nearby interior fixed point (if
it exists) should be reached. A numerical example is given in Figure 2.
Existence and uniqueness
In the previous section, the interior fixed point x = xˆwas arbitrary. Hence, linear stability
is shown for every interior fixed point. Suppose that f has more than one interior fixed
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point. Then there are at least two distinct interior fixed points, say, xˆ1 and xˆ2 with xˆ1 <
xˆ2. By our stability result, 1− 14 < ∂f∂x |x=xˆ1 < 1 and 1− 14 < ∂f∂x |x=xˆ2 < 1. Therefore,
there is some 0 < h xˆ2 − xˆ1 such that f(xˆ1 + h) < xˆ1 + h and f(xˆ2 − h) > xˆ2 − h.
By the intermediate value theorem, f must have at least one other fixed point, say, xˆ3
between xˆ1 and xˆ2 and such that ∂f∂x |x=xˆ3 > 1. But this means that xˆ3 is linearly unstable
contradicting the fact that every interior fixed point of f is linearly stable. Therefore, if a
stable interior fixed point exists, then it is unique.
The Perron root of a matrix is continuous in the matrix entries (Meyer 2015). The
Perron roots λ¯A(x) and λ¯B(x) are continuous in their respective entries F¯j,A(x) and
F¯j,B(x), which in turn are continuous in x via expected payoffs. Hence, λ¯A(x) and
λ¯B(x) are continuous in x and, by the intermediate value theorem, the function λ¯A(x)−
λ¯B(x) has at least one root in the (0, 1) interval when the following condition holds
sgn
(
λ¯A′(0)− λ¯B(0)
) 6= sgn (λ¯A′(1)− λ¯B(1)) , (52)
where sgn(·) is the sign function. This condition is sufficient for the existence of a unique
interior fixed point in our system in Equation (16), but it is not necessary. If the condition
is false, the function λ¯A(x) − λ¯B(x) may still have a root, provided that the x axis is
tangential to it at a point. However, we do not consider this possibility here.
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